Implementing Article 32 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child as a Domestic Statute: Protecting Children from Abusive Labor Practices by Kistenbroker, Hillary V.
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 44 | Issue 3
2012
Implementing Article 32 of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child as a Domestic Statute:
Protecting Children from Abusive Labor Practices
Hillary V. Kistenbroker
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Hillary V. Kistenbroker, Implementing Article 32 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child as a Domestic Statute: Protecting Children
from Abusive Labor Practices, 44 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 921 (2012)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol44/iss3/17
File: Kistenbroker 2 Created on: 9/1/2012 3:01:00 PM Last Printed: 9/1/2012 6:29:00 PM 
921 
IMPLEMENTING ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
THE CHILD AS A DOMESTIC STATUTE: PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM 
ABUSIVE LABOR PRACTICES 
Hillary V. Kistenbroker*
 
 
Child labor exists everywhere, even in the United States. Exemp-
tions in the Fair Labor Standards Act chip away at the law’s effectiveness 
and create loopholes for abuse, particularly with children employed in ag-
riculture. Article 32 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides 
that children have the right to protection from “economic exploitation” and 
hazardous labor. This Note examines the need for improvement in federal 
child labor laws and why such reform is important to protect children at 
home and abroad. Congress should implement a domestic statute embody-
ing the functionalities of Article 32 of the CRC, as such a statute would help 
establish and enshrine the CRC’s protections and mirror emerging norms in 
international law. Such a law would serve as a model for other countries 
and stand as a powerful vindication of America’s commitment to            
international human rights. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rub-
ber Co. stunned children’s rights advocates around the world when it de-
clined to hold Firestone liable for exploiting twenty-three Liberian child 
laborers.1 The plaintiff children worked at Firestone’s rubber plant and filed 
suit against the company pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).2 They 
alleged Firestone’s plantation used hazardous child labor in violation of 
customary international law.3 Firestone tacitly encouraged such employment 
by setting high daily production quotas for its “legal” employees, who were 
primarily poor Liberian agricultural workers.4 To ensure that they met daily 
quotas, workers would hire other Liberians cheaply, or, alternatively, “dra-
goon their wives or children into helping them, at no monetary cost.”5  
While working on the Firestone plantation, the children used ma-
chetes to cut the bark off of rubber trees and drain the latex into large   
  
 1 Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011); James Warren, 
Well-Known Judge Stuns in Ruling on Child Labor, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2011, at A19; Noel 
Tripp, Seventh Circuit Affirms District Court’s Rejection of Child Labor Claim Based on 
Work Performed in Africa, JACKSON LEWIS LLP (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.wageandhour 
lawupdate.com/2011/08/articles/wage-and-hour/coverage/seventh-circuit-affirms-district-
courts-rejection-of-child-labor-claim-based-on-work-performed-in-africa/.  
 2 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The ATS gives district courts original jurisdiction over “any 
civil action brought by an alien for tort only, committed in violation of the laws of nations or 
a treaty of the United States.” Id.; see generally RALPH GUSTAV STEINHARDT & ANTHONY A. 
D’AMATO, THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY (1999) (offering 
background information and various explanations and interpretations of the ATS).  
 3 Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1015.   
 4 Id. at 1023.  
 5 Id.  
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buckets.6 The children also sprayed trees with fungicides and various other 
potentially toxic chemicals without any safety equipment.7 After the lawsuit 
was filed, Firestone’s president admitted that each worker would tap about 
650 trees per day, which amounts to approximately twenty-one hours of 
labor.8   
While the Seventh Circuit found that corporations could be held li-
able under the ATS, the court did not hold Firestone liable for violating the 
law of nations.9 The court acknowledged that although the labor was clearly 
“hazardous,” the case nevertheless had to be dismissed.10 Writing for the 
court, Judge Richard Posner explained that current sources of international 
law regarding child labor did not allow him to “distill a crisp rule.”11 This 
  
 6 Id. at 1024; Warren, supra note 1. A typical work day would begin around 4 AM and 
end in the late afternoon. Jonathan Stempel, Firestone Wins Liberian Child Labor Case in 
U.S., THOMSON REUTERS, (July 12, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/ 
News/2011/07_-_July/Firestone_wins_Liberian_child_labor_case_in_U_S_/.  
 7 Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1024; Warren, supra note 1.   
 8 Warren, supra note 1. 
 9 Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1024. The portion of Judge Posner’s opinion addressing ATS liabil-
ity largely responds to the Second Circuit’s controversial holding in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., which rejected the proposition that corporations can be held liable under the 
ATS for violating customary international law. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 
111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). The Seventh Circuit criticized the 
result in Kiobel as “incorrect” and an “outlier.” Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017. 
 10 Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1024. The court also discussed whether the plaintiffs had given 
enough information to show that violations of international child labor occurred on the plan-
tation. The court explained that it had little basis for comparison in the quality of life be-
tween children who worked on the plantation and children who did not. Judge Posner wrote, 
“[W]e don’t know the net effect on their welfare of working on the plantation.” Id. While an 
interesting question, it seems to undervalue the danger that children on the plantation faced. 
Just because the children may have had a better quality of life on the plantation does not 
negate the fact that children as young as six were allowed to use machetes and haul heavy 
buckets of latex for great distances. Moreover, the fact that at least some of the children were 
“dragooned” by their fathers into working on the plantation seems tantamount to forced 
labor. There is an international consensus against corporations forced labor, as described in 
the Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour. See Convention Concerning 
Forced or Compulsory Labor, art. 5, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 (“No concession granted 
to private individuals, companies or associations shall involve any form of forced or compul-
sory labour for the production or the collection of products which such private individuals, 
companies or associations utilise or in which they trade.”). 175 countries have ratified the 
Convention. Ratifications of C029—Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29), INT’L LABOR 
ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:4127467660166947::NO:11300:P 
113 00_INSTRUMENT_ID:312174 (last visited June 24, 2012).  
 11 Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023. The court examined three international conventions: Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]; Conven-
tion Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, June 26, 1973, 1015 
U.N.T.S. 298; Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimi-
nation of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161. The court 
also examined Recommendation 190, which supplements the Convention Concerning the 
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lack of a clear international principle made it difficult for the court to     
determine which actions violated international law.12  
Although the international community has made much advancement 
in recognizing and protecting children’s rights,13 Flomo illustrates that some 
courts are hesitant to acknowledge that international child labor law has 
risen to the status of custom enforceable under the ATS. This is particularly 
true with respect to Article 32(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC), which recognizes a child’s right to protection from exploita-
tion or labor, which might harm his development.14 The Seventh Circuit 
criticized Article 32’s language as “too vague and encompassing to create 
an international legal norm.”15  
The purpose of this Note is to propose that Congress should codify 
a domestic statute implementing the same functionalities as Article 32 of the 
CRC, as such a statute would help establish and enshrine the protections 
therein and mirror emerging norms in international law. Part Two explains 
why the U.S. has failed to ratify the CRC as a whole and analyzes the text 
of Article 32 in depth. Part Three of this Note establishes why current child 
labor laws in the U.S. and other countries provide inadequate protection. 
Part Four examines the extent to which U.S. law already complies with Ar-
ticle 32 and discusses areas for improvement. Finally, Part Five proposes a 
new domestic statute and explains how it would be beneficial, drawing on a 
comparison to the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. 
  
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour. 
Recommendation 190 specifies that conditions such as long hours, exposure to harmful 
chemicals, and excessive noise levels are likely to harm children’s health and safety. Howev-
er, the court declined to apply Recommendation 190, as it created “no enforceable obliga-
tions” on states party to the Convention. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023–24; International Labour 
Organization, Recommendation Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, Recommendation 190 (June, 17, 1999), 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc87/com-chir.htm.  
 12 See Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1024 (“[W]e have not been given an adequate basis for inferring 
a violation of customary international law, bearing in mind the Supreme Court’s insistence 
on caution in recognizing new norms of customary international law in litigation under the 
Alien Tort Statute.”); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (“[T]he judicial 
power should be exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant 
doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms today.”).  
 13 See GERALDINE VAN BUREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 1–
25 (1995) (explaining the historical development of international law on children’s rights); 
see also Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer the Children? A Call for United States 
Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 19 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 161, 162–64 (2006) (explaining the U.N.’s historical significance after World War II 
and the role that the U.N. plays in protecting human rights). Eliminating child labor is part of 
the U.N.’s Millennium Development Goals. See G.A. Res. 65/1, ¶ 70(f), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/65/1 (Oct. 19, 2010).  
 14 See, e.g., CRC, supra note 11, art. 32(1).  
 15 Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1022.  
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II. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD ARTICLE 32: A PROPOSED 
SOLUTION 
A. Background on the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child is an international 
agreement establishing “a comprehensive set of goals for individual nations 
to achieve on behalf of their children.”16 The CRC affirms children’s basic 
civil, political, economic, social and humanitarian rights.17 Every member of 
the U.N. has ratified the CRC except for the U.S. and Somalia.18 Although 
the U.S. signed the CRC on February 16, 1995,19 signing a treaty does not 
legally bind a country.20  
Thus, the CRC “does not have the force of domestic law and does 
not create binding obligations” until it has undergone the full ratification 
process in Congress.21 However, the CRC is an international custom, even 
though the U.S. has not ratified.22 As such, the CRC is only enforceable 
through the second clause of the Alien Tort Statute, which allows jurisdic-
tion when a foreign plaintiff claims a violation of international custom.23 
  
 16 Convention on the Rights of the Child: Frequently Asked Questions, AMNESTY INT’L, 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/children-s-rights/convention-on-the-rights-of-
the-child-0 (last visited June 24, 2012). 
 17 See CRC, supra note 11, pmbl. (recognizing that children are an integral part of society 
and the family unit, and, as such, require “special care and assistance”). 
 18 See Status of Ratifications of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. TREATY 
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited June 24, 2012). Somalia is unable to ratify at this time 
because it does not have a recognized government. Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
Frequently Asked Questions, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30229.html (last 
visited June 24, 2012).  
 19 CRC, supra note 11.  
 20 See Rutkow & Lozman, supra note 13, at 166 (“Although signature of a treaty is gener-
ally understood to demonstrate intent to ratify after signature, ratification is not always im-
minent.”). 
 21 Kurtis A. Kemper, Construction and Application of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989)—Global Cases and Administrative Decisions, 
20 A.L.R FED. 2D 95, § 2 (2007). The U.S. Constitution provides that the President can make 
treaties with other countries with the “Advice and Consent of the Senate.” U.S. CONST. art II, 
§ 2, cl. 2. Without going through this process, a treaty has no legal force.  
 22 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 176–77 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding unanimity is not 
required for a treaty or agreement to become an international custom); see also Flomo, 643 
F.3d at 1021–22 (noting that requiring unanimity would give every nation veto power over 
customary international law).  
 23 The first clause allows for jurisdiction over violations of the law of nations. Since the 
U.S. has yet to ratify a treaty providing a cause of action for child laborers, plaintiffs are 
limited to U.S. courts and could not use an international tribunal. Jessica Bergman, Note, The 
Alien Tort Statute and Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Company: The Key to Change in 
Global Child Labor Practices?, 18. Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 455, 462 (2011). 
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Yet the Seventh Circuit’s criticism in Flomo demonstrates that the ATS is 
unlikely to provide remedy to foreign plaintiffs seeking to enforce          
customary international law relating to child labor.  
B. Resistance to Ratification of the Convention as a Whole 
The government’s failure to ratify the CRC is largely attributable to 
political controversy and misconception about the CRC’s intent, language, 
and purpose.24 Opponents of the CRC usually have two main arguments:  
(1) the CRC will interfere with parents’ judicially implied constitutional 
right to raise children,25 and (2) ratifying the CRC will weaken U.S. sover-
eignty and give the U.N. power to determine how American children are 
treated within our legal system.26 Opponents take issue with the whole text 
of the CRC and believe that the CRC as a whole places an unwarranted lev-
el of importance on children’s rights to the detriment of parental rights.27 
Interest groups also fear that ratification of the CRC will permit children to 
sue their parents and enable teenagers to get abortions without parental con-
sent.28 Scholars have largely dismissed these two main arguments because 
opponents fail to adequately comprehend the true text and purpose of the 
treaty.29  
Groups concerned that the CRC will compromise American sover-
eignty fail to realize that the U.S. cannot legally be bound to a treaty     
  
 24 See, e.g., Michelle Z. Hall, Convention on the Rights of the Child: Has America Closed 
Its Eyes?, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 923, 925 (2001) (explaining that political dynamics 
are the main cause of the U.S.’s failure to ratify the CRC). 
 25 Rutkow & Lozman, supra note 13, at 179; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
400 (1923) (holding the “liberty” protected by the due process clause included the right to 
establish a home and bring up children); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names 
of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (holding that parents can decide how to educate 
and raise their children without interference from the state). 
 26 Jonathan Todres, Analyzing the Opposition to U.S. Ratification of the U.N. Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, in THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN 
ANALYSIS OF TREATY PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. RATIFICATION 20 (Jonathan 
Todres, et al. eds., 2006). 
 27 See, e.g., Kevin Mark Smith, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
The Sacrifice of American Children on the Altar of Third World Activism, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 
111, 122–24 (1998) (“[The CRC] will limit the ability of U.S. parents to act in the best inter-
ests of their children, as only they are deemed qualified to do.”). 
 28 See Bruce C. Hafen & Johnathan O. Hafen, Abandoning Children to Their Autonomy: 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 449, 460 
(1996) (arguing the CRC grants unrestricted access to abortions and is thus incompatable 
with U.S. laws); but see Hall, supra note 24, at 926–27 (responding to arguments that the 
CRC authorizes abortion for minors without parental consent). 
 29 See, e.g., Susan Kilbourne, Placing the Convention on the Rights of the Child in an 
American Context, 26 HUM. RTS. 27, 29 (1999) (concluding that most arguments opposing 
the CRC are false).  
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without voluntary consent.30 While ratifying a treaty may restrict U.S. sov-
ereignty in a specific area, Congress has the power to determine when such 
a tradeoff is worthwhile.31 Since the U.S. views international treaties as non-
self-executing, the act of ratification itself should be viewed as an exercise 
of sovereignty.32 In the event of a conflict between the two bodies of law, 
the Constitution would always supersede the CRC.33  
Furthermore, neither the U.N. nor the CRC provide how a state par-
ty should implement or enforce the treaty.34 Instead, the CRC created a 
Committee on the Rights of the Child to evaluate how ratifying countries 
have implemented the CRC’s provisions and provide guidance for im-
provement.35 The Committee bases its evaluation on periodic reports sub-
mitted by each country.36 CRC Article 45 also allows the Committee to use 
additional methods to monitor compliance – such as consulting specialized 
agencies, commissioning studies for additional information, and publishing 
general recommendations and suggestions.37 However, Article 45 is not 
technically an enforcement mechanism because individual states have the 
ultimate power to choose how to implement the CRC’s goals.38               
  
 30 The U.S. has approached most international human rights treaties as non-self-executing 
documents. See generally Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratificaiton of Human Rights Conventions: 
The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341 (1995) (offering an in-depth analysis of 
U.S. policies towards ratification of international human rights treaties). 
 31 Rutkow & Lozman, supra note 13, at 181. 
 32 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law and 
the U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1989, 1995 (2004).  
 33 See U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. (stating that the U.S. Constitution is the “Supreme Law of 
the Land” and takes precedence over all other laws and treaties). 
 34 Hall, supra note 24, at 925–26; see also Implementation: Fulfilling Obligations Under 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocols, UNICEF, 
http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30208.html (last visited June 24, 2012) (“There are no 
specific right or wrong implementation measures, however the Convention should be the 
main benchmark and inspiration for all government action.”).  
 35 CRC, supra note 11, art. 43. Article 43 creates the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child. See generally Cynthia Price Cohen, Implementing the U.N. Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 95 (2000) (providing a detailed description of the CRC’s 
enforcement procedures in articles 43–45). 
 36 CRC, supra note 11, art. 44. The initial report is due to the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child, through the U.N. Secretary-General, within two years of a state party’s ratification. 
All subsequent reports must be submitted once every five years. States party must also make 
reports available to the public within their own borders. Id. 
 37 Id. art. 45. The Committee on the Rights of the Child may also invite other specialized 
organizations within the U.N., such as the U.N. Children’s Fund to submit reports on particu-
lar issues. Id.  
 38 See Timothy A. Glut, Changing the Approach to Ending Child Labor: An International 
Solution to an International Problem, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1203, 1224–25 (1995) 
(“Article 45 comes the closest to providing for enforcement, by requiring agencies that moni-
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Furthermore, the U.S. has ratified many other human rights treaties with no 
adverse effects on sovereignty.39 
Opponents also portray the CRC as anti-family and impinging on 
parental rights, when in reality, the CRC espouses the opposite. The text of 
the CRC makes numerous references to a child’s place within the family 
and favorably describes the family unit as a whole. For example, the Pre-
amble refers to the family as “a fundamental group of society” and “the 
natural environment for growth and well-being.”40 Article 5 obliges states 
party to “respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents.”41 Moreo-
ver, Article 9 requires states party to ensure that children are not separated 
from their parents against their will, except in cases where competent au-
thorities deem it necessary for the child’s best interest.42 As evidenced at 
various points in the text, drafters of the CRC intended to “preserve the bal-
ance” between children’s rights and family rights, rather than reduce a par-
ent’s legitimate rights or undermine the family unit.43 Opponents claiming 
that the CRC is anti-family take the treaty out of context and ignore the fact 
that children can, and often do, become victims of neglect and abuse.44  
  
tor the child labor problem to report the suggestions and recommendations for the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly.”). 
 39 See United States Ratification of International Rights Treaties, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 
24, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/24/united-states-ratification-international-huma 
n-rights-treaties.  
 40 CRC, supra note 11, pmbl. 
 41 See id. art. 5.  
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, 
where applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided 
for by local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the 
child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, 
appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recog-
nized in the present Convention. 
Id. 
 42 See id. art. 9(1). 
States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents 
against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review de-
termine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is 
necessary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may be necessary 
in a particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of the child by the par-
ents, or one where the parents are living separately and a decision must be made as 
to the child's place of residence. 
Id.  
 43 SHARON DETRICK, A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE 
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 271 (1999).  
 44 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Family Supporting Nature of the U.N. Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, in THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN 
ANALYSIS OF TREATY PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. RATIFICATION 39 (Jonathan 
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Furthermore, opponents have no legitimate basis for inferring that 
the CRC authorizes children to sue their parents and obtain abortions with-
out parental consent.45 In the U.S., children already have the right to sue 
their parents for certain causes of action, such as gross parental negli-
gence.46 Even if the CRC did permit such lawsuits it would not be creating a 
“new” right for children. Critics of the CRC mistakenly interpret the treaty 
to provide a right to receive an abortion without parental consent.47 Article 
16 grants the child a right to privacy, but is silent on the issue of abortion.48 
The CRC is purposely silent with respect to abortion and the rights of un-
born children so that the treaty would appeal to a wide variety of cultural 
backgrounds.49 Article 1 broadly defines a child as “every human being be-
low the age of eighteen years,” but does not specify when childhood be-
gins.50 Article 1’s flexibility has enabled countries with strict abortion laws, 
such as Ireland and the Philippines, to ratify the CRC, as well as those coun-
tries with more liberal abortion laws.51 Given this information, ratification 
of the CRC would not conflict with current laws or policies in the U.S.   
relating to abortion.52 
  
Todres et al., 2006) (explaining that the CRC focused on children’s rights to encourage gov-
ernments to protect children from systematic abuse).  
 45 See Rutkow & Lozman, supra note 13, at 186–87 (discussing the CRC’s family-centric 
point of view and explaining the CRC does not take a position on abortion); cf. Todres, supra 
note 26, at 24 (explaining that any means for a child to sue their parents would come from 
existing national or state law, but not the CRC).  
 46 See CYNTHIA PRICE COHEN & SUSAN H. BITENSKY, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON 
THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: ANSWERS TO 30 QUESTIONS 3 (1994) (explaining that children can 
already sue their parents under U.S. laws, so ratification of the CRC would not present a 
conflict even if it did endorse such a right). 
 47 See, e.g., Todres, supra note 26, at 25–26.  
 48 CRC, supra note 11, art. 16 (providing that children have a right to legal protection 
from “arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, or correspondence, 
nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation.”).  
 49 See Philip Alston, The Unborn Child and Abortion Under the Draft Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 156–57 (1990) (explaining that drafters of the CRC 
deliberately discussed the rights of the unborn, but decided to keep silent on the issue); see 
also Alison Dundes Renteln, Who’s Afraid of the CRC: Objections to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 629, 633–34 (1997) (analyzing the CRC’s 
text and concluding it was purposefully drafted not to take a position on abortion). 
 50 CRC, supra note 11, art. 1. The treaty also allows for country’s laws who lower the age 
of majority to younger than eighteen years. Id.  
 51 See Status of Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 18 
(providing a complete list of ratifications and reservations to the CRC); Hall, supra note 24, 
at 927 (describing how countries with both strict and liberal abortion laws have ratified the 
CRC).  
 52 See Rutkow & Lozman, supra note 13, at 186 (noting the CRC does not conflict with 
American abortion or family planning laws).  
File: Kistenbroker 2 Created on:  9/1/2012 3:01:00 PM Last Printed: 9/1/2012 6:29:00 PM 
930 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:921 
None of the opponents’ arguments would impede codifying Article 
32 in a domestic statute, as the majority of controversy centers around top-
ics other than economic exploitation.53 Yet, ratification of the CRC still 
seems distant on the horizon, due to the political rhetoric surrounding the 
CRC as a whole.54 Meanwhile, children living domestically and abroad suf-
fer from the harmful effects of parents and employers who abuse loopholes 
or the lack of effective national regulation. The U.S. has already imple-
mented legislation attempting to regulate child labor.55 In this way, adopting 
a federal statute mirroring Article 32 merely builds upon a concept with 
which Americans already agree – exploitative child labor should be       
eradicated. 
C.  Textual Analysis of CRC Article 32 
Article 32 has two main subsections: subsection (1) affirms the 
child’s right to be free from exploitative and harmful labor, while subsec-
tion (2) requires states to take an active role in preventing child labor. Arti-
cle 32(1) of the CRC explains that states party “recognize the right of the 
child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any 
work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, 
or be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or 
social development.”56 Article 32 thus aims to protect children from work-
ing in certain occupations, while also providing protection to those children 
who are eligible for work.57   
Economic exploitation can generally be defined as forcing or en-
couraging labor at the expense of an individual’s health and well-being and 
the development of society.58 However, figuring out precisely which types 
of labor conditions constitute economic exploitation proves difficult given 
the language of Article 32.59 For instance, it may not be clear that a child’s 
  
 53 See generally Karen A. McSweeney, The Potential for Enforcement of the United Na-
tions Convention on the Rights of the Child: The Need to Improve the Information Base, 16 
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 467 (1993) (explaining that much of the CRC controversy cen-
ters on the abortion debate, minimum eligible age for military service, and children’s indirect 
participation in armed conflicts).  
 54 See Dundes Renteln, supra note 49, at 631 (explaining that the CRC has been the sub-
ject of multiple political controversies).  
 55 See Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). 
 56 CRC, supra note 11, art. 32(1).  
 57 VAN BUREN, supra note 13, at  263.  
 58 Id. at 264.  
 59 See Elisabeth A. Mason, Child Labor and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, in THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF TREATY 
PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. RATIFICATION 267 (Jonathan Todres et al. eds., 2006) 
(explaining that it is difficult to apply the rights described in article 32(1) to situations in 
reality).  
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health or social development is at risk while working in a specific occupa-
tion because the detrimental effects do not appear until later in life.  
During the drafting process of Article 32, most of the countries in-
volved were in agreement about recognizing a child’s right to be free from 
economic exploitation.60 The main issue for many participating countries 
concerned what types of work children have a right not to perform.61 This is 
reflected in the final text, which recognizes the child’s right to protection 
from economic exploitation and from performing certain types of work.62 
UNICEF has identified the following elements of economic exploitation: 
working too many hours, inadequate wages, work that negatively impacts 
the child’s mental and physical development, beginning full-time work at a 
very early age, or work that entails an excessive amount of responsibility.63 
These factors can help a court determine whether the facts of a given case 
constitute economic exploitation under Article 32, in addition to any other 
factors that the court may deem relevant. 
Additionally, Article 32 does not specify which types of work can 
harm the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral, or social devel-
opment.  Use of the word “or” suggests that the child has a right to refuse 
performing any work that harms him in any way described by Article 32.64 
The CRC also does not establish how material the harm needs to be before a 
child refuses to work. Rather, it seems that the frequency, intensity, and 
general nature of the work are all factors to evaluate the extent to which a 
given task impacts a child.65  
The second clause of Article 32 provides several guidelines for 
states party to reference when implementing Article 32(1). These guidelines 
focus on legislative remedies, encouraging states party to: 
 
(a) Provide for a minimum age or minimum ages for  
admission to employment;  
 
  
 60 See OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 693–708 (2007) (summarizing different nation’s 
comments on drafts of the CRC).  
 61 Id. The main linguistic changes center around the exact wording of what children should 
be protected from. The first draft of Article 32 acknowledged the child’s right to protection 
from “all forms of neglect, cruelty, and exploitation.” Id. at 693. The first revised version 
changed this language to “all forms of discrimination, social exploitation, and degradation of 
his dignity.” Id. at 697. Additional discussion finally led to the Working Group’s adoption of 
the words “economic exploitation,” as it currently reads in Article 32. Id. at 703.  
 62 VAN BUREN, supra note 13, at 264. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Mason, supra note 59, at 268.  
 65 See id. (explaining that several factors contribute to the child’s right to be protected 
from harmful work). 
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(b) Provide for appropriate regulation of the hours and  
conditions of employment; [and]  
 
(c) Provide for appropriate penalties or other sanctions to  
ensure the effective enforcement of the present article.66  
 
Article 32 also recommends that states implement social and educa-
tion measures to ensure compliance.67 By giving a list of legislative provi-
sions and suggestions for social programming, the second clause creates 
scaffolding for states party to ensure that they meet the minimum standards 
for compliance with Article 32(1).68  However, these guidelines are still 
broad enough to ensure that states party have the ultimate power in     
choosing how to implement Article 32’s provisions.69  
III. CURRENT CHILD LABOR LAWS DO NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE 
PROTECTION 
Sadly, the Liberian children’s suffering in Flomo is not unique. The 
International Labour Organization estimates that approximately 215 million 
children in the world are engaged in child labor.70 Approximately 70% of 
these children work in agriculture, while the remaining children work in 
service businesses and industry.71 The majority of child laborers are in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America,72 but this is not just a developing world problem. 
These statistics likely underestimate the number of working children, as 
poorer nations do not maintain this type of data.73 Further, knowing the gen-
eral distaste for such labor, reporting is likely significantly lower than the 
actual rates.  
  
 66 CRC, supra note 11, art. 32(2).  
 67 Id. 
 68 See id. (“States Parties shall in particular . . . .”).  
 69 Price Cohen, supra note 35, at 95–96 (explaining that state parties must submit reports 
to the Committee on the Rights of the Child and detailing precisely how they have chosen to 
implement Article 32’s provisions). 
 70 Child Labour, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/child-labour/lang--
en/index.htm (last visited June 24, 2012).  
 71 Megha Bahree, Child Labor, FORBES.COM (Mar. 10, 2008), http://www.forbes.com/gl 
obal /2008/0310/062.html. 
 72 See Percentage of Children Aged 5–14 Engaged in Child Labor, UNICEF, http://www.   
childinfo.org/labour_countrydata.php?q=printme (last visited June 24, 2012) (giving a de-
tailed chart of the total percentage of children aged and 5–14 engaged in child labor in each 
country).  
 73 See David L. Parker, Child Labor: The Impact of Economic Exploitation on the Health 
and Welfare of Children, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 177, 181 (1999) (explaining that maintaining 
accurate data on child labor is difficult in both developed and undeveloped nations). 
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A. The Problem of Exploitative Child Labor: A Self-Fulfilling    
Prophecy 
The negative effects of exploitative child labor extend into nearly 
every aspect of the child’s life and can have far-reaching social consequenc-
es.74 Poverty is both a cause and consequence of exploitative child labor.75 
For example, studies have found a strong correlation between child labor 
and malnutrition, illiteracy, and lack of maternal education.76  Child laborers 
also face a myriad of health concerns resulting from the specific types of 
labor that they often perform, including irreversible neurological damage 
from exposure to toxic substances, such as lead.77 Repeated exposure to 
mercury and carbon monoxide also pose significant reproductive hazards 
and can impede a child’s growth and development.78 Another study revealed 
that children who are abused physically or sexually in the workplace are 
extremely likely to suffer from a psychiatric mental condition by the time 
they reach twenty-one years.79 Child laborers are also substantially more 
likely to engage in substance abuse, experience low self-esteem, and      
participate in anti-social behavior.80 
  
 74 See, e.g., Glut, supra note 38, at 1208 (explaining that child labor reduces society’s 
level of education and creates a cycle of poverty, in addition to jeopardizing children’s health 
and future earnings).  
 75 The World Health Organization has a particularly helpful chart demonstrating the inter-
play between poverty and child labor. Children’s Environmental Health: Hazardous Child 
Labor, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/ceh/risks/labour/en/index.html 
(last visited June 24, 2012); see also Glut, supra note 38, at 1207–08 (arguing that child 
labor contributes to poverty by preventing children from obtaining an education and advanc-
ing to higher paying jobs).  
 76 M. Aminul Islam et al., Maternal and Socioeconomic Factors and the Risk of Severe 
Malnutrition in a Child: A Case-Control Study, 48 EUR. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 416, 418–19 
(1994). 
 77 Parker, supra note 73, at 184. Dr. Parker also points out that, “[A] child who begins 
work at an early age has many more years to develop a problem compared to adults with 
similar exposure.” Id. at 185. Children’s bodies also appear to be more sensitive to toxic 
substances, as their bodies are not completely developed and therefore more susceptible to 
damage. Id. 
 78 Id. at 184.   
 79 Long Term Consequences of Child Abuse and Neglect, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM 
SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, http://www. 
childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/long_term_consequences.cfm (last visited June 24, 2012). 
Child Information Welfare Gateway cites a study that found 80% of young adults who had 
been abused or neglected as children met the criteria for at least one psychiatric disorder. 
Abused children commonly suffer from disorders such as depression, anxiety, dissociative 
disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder, and reactive attachment disorder. Id. 
 80 See Atalay Alem et al., Child Labor and Childhood Behavioral and Mental Health 
Problems in Ethiopia, 20 ETHIOP. J. HEALTH DEV. 119, 123 (2006) (providing a chart com-
paring statistics on the frequency of specific symptoms of mental health disorders in child 
laborers with non-laboring children). 
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Not surprisingly, employers in developing countries typically do not 
fear repercussions for exploiting children; as such exploitation increases 
profits without the risk of significant sanctions.81 American companies that 
import and purchase products made by children further reinforce the bene-
fits of exploitative child labor.82 As a result, many developing countries are 
unable to enforce their own child labor laws.83 Thus, developed countries, 
like the U.S., ought to step in and provide a real incentive for companies to 
comply.84  
B. U.S. Child Labor Law: Loopholes and Opportunities for            
Exploitation 
Exploitative child labor is not exclusive to developing countries; it 
is rampant throughout the developed world as well.85 Although domestic 
child labor regulations appear to have eradicated all forms of exploitative 
child labor, this perception is largely inaccurate.86 Children in the U.S. are 
subjected to working conditions that compromise their safety, expose them 
to numerous health risks, and interfere with schoolwork.87 In order to 
  
 81 See Glut, supra note 38, at 1209 (“A child work force, accordingly, means greater prof-
its for employers.”).  
 82 Matthew C. Bazzano, Child Labor: What the United States and its Corporations Can 
Do To Eliminate its Use, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 200, 200 (1996).  
 83 Bergman, supra note 23, at 456.  
 84 See Glut, supra note 38, at 1224 (“Employers are unlikely to relinquish access to such 
cheap, exploitable labor unless someone threatens them with effective penalties.”); Donald 
C. Dowling, Jr., The Multinational’s Manifesto on Sweatshops, Trade/Labor Linkage, and 
Codes of Conduct, 8 TULSA J. COMP & INT’L L. 27, 33–34 (2000) (proposing developing 
countries are more protective than developed countries on paper, but such laws are still very 
difficult to enforce); India: Child Labor Law Welcomed, But Needs Enforcing, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Oct. 6, 2006), http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/10/04/india-child-labor-law-welcom 
ed-needs-enforcing (describing how India passed a law banning all forms of labor for chil-
dren under 14 years, but enforcement is still incredibly problematic). The article also dis-
cusses a study, which took place between 1996 and 2003, that found most government offi-
cials who were responsible for enforcing child labor laws had failed to do so. The study also 
found that illegal employers of children were almost never sanctioned. Id. 
 85 See Erik Eckholm, U.S. Cracks Down on Farmers Who Hire Children, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 19, 2010, at A1 (describing stories from migrant farmers and their families about chil-
dren working illegally in the blueberry fields of North Carolina); Bazzano, supra note 82, at 
200. (“In the United States, while fewer children work than in the regions of Africa, Latin 
America and Asia, child labor still exists.”).   
 86 See Davin C. Curtiss, Note, The Fair Labor Standards Act and Child Labor in Agricul-
ture, 20 J. CORP. L. 303, 307–308 (1995) (addressing the myths of child labor in agriculture).  
 87 See Celeste Corlett, Note, Impact of the 2000 Child Labor Treaty on the United States 
Laborers, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 713, 719 –23 (demonstrating that children working in 
agriculture are subject to many health and safety risks due to the inherently dangerous nature 
of farming occupations).  
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demonstrate how employers exploit loopholes in U.S. child labor law, it is 
first necessary to understand its historical development. 
Before the early 1900s, the U.S. lacked any restrictions on the max-
imum number of hours or types of occupations that children could per-
form.88 During the Industrial Revolution, children typically worked four-
teen-hour days using extremely dangerous machinery that often resulted in 
traumatic injuries and death.89 In 1916, Congress responded to concerns 
about injuries to child laborers by adopting legislation that prohibited     
interstate commerce of goods made with child labor.90  
However, in Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Supreme Court held this 
legislation was an unconstitutional use of Congress’s commerce power, as 
employment law was a “local” matter, rather than a “federal” matter. 91 The 
majority reasoned that Congress had overstepped its constitutional bounda-
ries because it tried to standardize state employment laws instead of regulat-
ing an intrinsically harmful product.92 Twenty-three years later, the Supreme 
Court declined to follow Hammer in United States v. Darby and presented a 
broader interpretation of the commerce clause.93 Darby led to current child 
labor law, which is largely embodied in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938.94  
1. The Fair Labor Standards Act and its Treatment of Child Labor 
Section 212(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) prohibits 
employers from using “oppressive” child labor in interstate commerce or 
“in production of goods for commerce or in any enterprise engaged in 
  
 88 STEPHEN B. WOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE AREA 5–6 (1968).  
 89 See KEVIN HILLSTROM & LAURIE COLLIER HILSTROM, INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICA: MINING AND PETROLEUM 205 (2006) (describing how children often were killed or 
maimed in factory accidents during the Industrial Revolution). 
 90 See generally HUGH D. HINDMAN, CHILD LABOR: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 65–70 (2002) 
(describing the passage of the Keating-Owen Act of 1916).  
 91 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918).  
 92 Id. at 272–73. Prior to Dagenhart, there had been a series of cases affirming Congress’s 
power to regulate products that were intrinsically harmful. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 
(1903) (upholding a law prohibiting interstate transportation of lottery tickets); Hippolite Egg 
Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (upholding Congress’s power to enact the Pure 
Food and Drugs Act, which proscribed interstate transportation and delivery of impure food 
and drugs); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding the constitutionality of a 
law which prohibited transporting women across state lines for the purpose of prostitution). 
The Court drew a distinction between prior cases and Dagenhart because the products made 
by child laborers were not intrinsically immoral or harmful.  
 93 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941).  
 94 Darby established the constitutionality of the FLSA. Darby, 312 U.S. at 125–26; see 
also HINDMAN, supra note 90, at 85.  
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commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.”95 FLSA sets a gen-
eral standard of sixteen years as the minimum age for admission to em-
ployment.
 96 While courts often construe the scope of interstate commerce 
widely,97 FLSA’s definition of “oppressive child labor” is riddled with ex-
ceptions.98 These exceptions swallow a significant portion of FLSA’s     
general rule and leave many children unprotected.99 
First, FLSA exempts family employment.100 Parents employing 
children in their family do not have to comply with restrictions on the num-
ber of hours a child can work in a week.101 The only restriction FLSA places 
on parental employment is that the child may not engage in mining, manu-
facturing, or an occupation found by the Secretary of Labor to be “particu-
larly hazardous.”102 The employee child does not even have to be a biologi-
cal child, as the statute permits parents or guardians to employ “children in 
[their] custody.”103 Parents who abuse this exemption can legally employ 
children within their custody in ways that interfere with the child’s health, 
education, or well-being.104 Abuse of this exception primarily occurs within 
agricultural employment.105  
Second, FLSA grants the Secretary of Labor substantial discretion 
in making exemptions.106  The Secretary of Labor may exempt fourteen- and 
fifteen-year-olds in certain occupations to the extent the employment does 
not interfere with the child’s schooling, health, or well-being.107 To enforce 
  
 95 29 U.S.C. § 212(c) (2006). 
 96 29 U.S.C. § 203(l) states that “any employee under the age of sixteen years [that] is 
employed by an employer . . . in any occupation” will constitute oppressive child labor.  
 97 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (outlining three types of activ-
ities that Congress can regulate under the commerce clause—(1) channels of commerce; (2) 
instrumentalities, persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) activities that substantial-
ly affect or relate to interstate commerce).  
 98 29 U.S.C. § 203(l); Mason, supra note 59, at 270.  
 99 HINDMAN, supra note 90, at 85.  
100 29 U.S.C. § 203(l).  
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 This is not to say that all, or even the majority, of parents who employ their children 
exploit them. Rather this exemption takes away the law’s ability to punish parents who do 
abuse it. The fact that the law cannot adequately respond to such a situation is unfortunate to 
say the least.  
105 The exception for family employment is often abused in conjunction with agricultural 
employment, specifically when parents employ their own children as independent contrac-
tors. Curtiss, supra note 86, at 321–323. 
106 29 U.S.C. § 203(l). 
107 Id. Occupations in mining and manufacturing can never be exempt from the definition 
of “oppressive child labor.” Otherwise, the Secretary of Labor has significant flexibility to 
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FLSA’s provisions, the Secretary of Labor may require employers to pro-
vide proof of age for any employee.108 Employers found in violation of these 
provisions can be fined between $1,000 and $10,000 per child.109 While 
these monetary penalties have been assessed to affect employer’s future 
compliance with FLSA,110 such a punishment is contingent on the employer 
actually being caught in the first place.  
2. Special Exceptions for Children Working in Agriculture 
Section 213(c), which applies to children in agricultural occupa-
tions, further weakens FLSA’s standards.111 When Congress drafted these 
provisions, most people assumed that children working on farms engaged in 
family chores and learned valuable skills.112 However, this assumption does 
not hold true today. In fact, the law actually legalizes abusive labor       
practices against children working in agriculture.113  
For example, children as young as twelve may work in agricultural 
occupations within their school district if a parent or guardian consents, or if 
a parent or guardian is also employed on that farm.114 Children aged four-
teen or older may be employed without such parental consent.115 Additional-
ly, the Secretary of Labor may declare that a specific agricultural activity is 
too hazardous for any child under sixteen years old.116 However, the       
Secretary’s declarations do not apply to family agricultural businesses.117  
  
exempt certain occupations. The Secretary of Labor may issue orders or regulations to ex-
empt an occupation from the FLSA. Id.  
108 29 U.S.C. § 212(d).  
109 29 U.S.C. § 216 (e)(1)(A). The U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division is 
responsible for enforcing the FLSA’s child labor provisions. See generally Youth & Labor, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/youthlabor/index.htm (last visited June 
24, 2012). The actual amount of fines that an employer must pay depends on several factors, 
including the employer’s mental state, past violations, intervals between violations, and 
commitment to future compliance. 29 C.F.R. § 578.4 (2012). A willful violation of the FLSA 
occurs when the employer knows that his conduct is prohibited by the FLSA, whereas a 
violation committed in reckless disregard happens when the employer should have known 
that his conduct was prohibited but failed to make the appropriate inquiries. 29 C.F.R. § 
578.3 (2012).  
110 BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., THE REPORT ON THE YOUTH LABOR FORCE 11 (2000), availa-
ble at http://www.bls.gov/opub/rylf/pdf/chapter2.pdf 
111 Mason, supra note 59, at 271.  
112 Curtiss, supra note 86, at 308.  
113 See id. at 319–20 (“Simply put, such a depiction of child labor does not comport with 
the health risks that farming poses for young workers.”). 
114 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(1)(B) (2006).  
115 Id. § 213(c)(1)(C). 
116 Id. § 213(c)(1)(C).  
117 Id. § 213(c)(2).  
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Due to these exemptions, the FLSA offers little protection to chil-
dren employed on farms by their families and opens the door for parental 
abuse. Scholars recognize agriculture as a particularly dangerous occupation 
for any worker.118 Incidentally, agriculture is also the area that offers the 
least protection of children.119 While the law assumes that parents and 
guardians will act in the best interest of their children,120 sadly, Flomo tells 
us otherwise. 
Three loopholes within FLSA make it possible for farmers to ex-
ploit child laborers.121 First, the only major prohibition in § 213(c) is that 
work activities may not take place during school hours.122 This means that 
children can legally work more than 100 hours per week, as long as those 
100 hours do not conflict with school hours.123 Second, FLSA fails to ade-
quately protect child laborers from participating in activities that might be 
hazardous or detrimental to their health or well-being while working on a 
family farm.124 Third, FLSA exempts children employed by their parents 
from being paid above the minimum wage or receiving overtime pay-
ments.125 These exceptions create major educational and financial obstacles 
for child workers in agriculture. Depending on how quickly they work, chil-
dren can sometimes receive as little as $5.00 per hour.126 It is common for 
these children to miss school to work on the fields, or even drop out of 
school entirely.127  
  
118 Corlett, supra note 87, at 713; see also Eckholm, supra note 85 (“[U.S. law] permits 
children 12 and up to work without limits outside of school hours, exposing them, critics say, 
to pesticides that may pose a special threat to growing bodies and robbing too many of child-
hood itself.”). 
119 See Eckholm, supra note 85 (“A federal law adopted in 1938 exempts agriculture from 
child-labor rules that apply to other industries.”) 
120 Curtiss, supra note 86, at 321; see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982) 
(“Before a state may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural 
child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convinc-
ing evidence.”).  
121 Curtiss, supra note 86, at 321.  
122 29 U.S.C. § 213(1).  
123 See Corlett, supra note 87, at 724 (explaining that the FLSA offers no cap on the maxi-
mum hours children in agriculture can work during a day or a week.). 
124 Id. at 720.   
125 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a)(6).  
126 See ASS’N OF FARMWORKER OPPORTUNITY PROGRAMS, CHILDREN AT WORK: A GLIMPSE 
INTO THE LIVES OF CHILD FARMWORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES, at i (2009), available at 
http://afop.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/NC-Blueberry-Photo-Booklet-2009.pdf (noting 
children on blueberry farms earn $2.50 per bucket and it takes approximately 30 minutes to 
fill a bucket).  
127 See These Children Are Dropping Out of School at an Alarming Rate, ASS’N OF 
FARMWORKER OPPORTUNITY PROGRAMS, http://afop.org/children-in-the-fields/learn-the-
facts/#Children_are_dropping (last visited June 24, 2012) (explaining that half of all children 
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Loopholes in the FLSA’s coverage also result in easily preventable 
accidents and deaths.128 Children who work on farms beginning at an early 
age can only expect to live to forty-nine years of age,129 which is almost 
thirty years shorter than the American average of seventy-eight years.130 A 
variety of health and safety risks drastically reduce these children’s life ex-
pectancy. Agricultural child laborers often work twelve-hour days filled 
with hard physical labor and no overtime pay for their extra efforts.131 Chil-
dren working in agriculture regularly risk heat stroke, exposure to harmful 
chemicals, and becoming injured or permanently disabled.132 For example, 
children can become permanently disabled from carrying oversized loads of 
crops or using machinery, which they cannot safely operate due to their age 
and development.133 Moreover, children are at a developmental disad-
vantage compared to adult workers, which makes them more likely to suffer 
an accident due to inattention, fatigue, or poor judgment.134 
Abuse of these loopholes occurs within two different contexts: (1) 
migrant farm families; and (2) traditional farm families.135 Individuals who 
qualify as migrant workers can employ their own children as independent 
contractors and force them to work in dangerous conditions.136 In recent 
  
who regularly work in agriculture drop out of school). The U.S. Department of Labor 
acknowledges that migrant families will often employ their children to help harvest crops 
during certain seasons. However, the exact statistics for how regularly these children attend 
school during non-harvesting season are vague at best, as domestic agricultural child labor is 
largely “invisible—uncounted, often undocumented, and little understood.” See Child Labor 
in Commercial Agriculture, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INT’L AFF., http://www. 
dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/iclp/sweat2/commercial.htm (last visited June 24, 2012).  
128 Curtiss, supra note 86, at 323. For example, in July 2011, two fourteen-year old girls 
were electrocuted by a field irrigator while working on a corn field in Illinois. See OSHA 
Investigating Farm Accident that Killed Two Teen Girls, CHI. TRIB. (July 26, 2011), 
http://smfws.com/articles2011/articles_july_2011/art07262011.html. 
129 History, UNITED FARM WORKERS, http://www.ufw.org/_page.php?menu=research&i 
nc=history/12.html (last visited June 24, 2012).  
130 Data from 2011 indicates the average life expectancy in the U.S. is 78.37 years. The 
World Factbook: Life Expectancy at Birth, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ 
the-world-factbook/rankorder/2102rank.html (last visited June 24, 2012). 
131 Corlett, supra note 87, at 724. 
132 29 U.S.C. § 202 (a)–(b) (2006). 
133 Child Labor in Commercial Agriculture, supra note 127. 
134 See A. BEQUELE & W.E. MYERS, FIRST THINGS FIRST IN CHILD LABOUR: ELIMINATING 
WORK DETRIMENTAL TO CHILDREN 9 (1995) (explaining reasons why children are at an in-
creased risk for occupational injuries). 
135 Curtiss, supra note 86, at 321–23.  
136 See Marc Linder, Paternalistic State Intervention: The Contradictions of the Legal 
Empowerment of Vulnerable Workers, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 733, 754 (1990) (“If farmers 
succeed in classifying as self-employed parents who employ their own children as laborers, 
they can evade the ban on employing ‘oppressive child labor,’ because parents can employ 
their own children under the age of sixteen.”). 
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years, blueberry farmers have been slapped with fines and bad publicity for 
allowing adult employees of the farm to employ their own children in pick-
ing blueberries.137 Parents often employ their children as laborers to help 
financially support the family.138 These children are often deprived of edu-
cational stability because migrant families move to different areas of the 
country according to the various harvesting seasons.139 One study reports 
that migrant children will attend as many as ten different school districts in 
one year.140  
In traditional farming families, the abuse tends to center on the dan-
gerous tasks that parents allow their child employees to perform.141 For ex-
ample, a ten-year-old boy had his arm ripped off by a feeder wagon after a 
string from his snow suit got caught in the machinery.142 It is difficult to 
determine exactly how widespread the problem is and how many children 
are injured on family farms for various reasons: a lack of media attention, 
tolerance within the farm community for accidents, and underreporting.143 
In sum, the evils of exploitative child labor have well-documented 
consequences, creating a cycle of poverty, illness, and illiteracy. As the 
global marketplace grows, so will the domestic and international demand 
for cheap labor—particularly child labor.144 The U.S. is in a position to in-
fluence the usage of exploitative child labor due to its major role in the 
global economy and its power to amend current domestic law.145 According-
ly, the U.S. should provide the protection that children both require and 
deserve by enacting legislation that implements the functionalities of Article 
32. 
  
137 Eckholm, supra note 85.  
138 Id. 
139 HUM. RTS. WATCH, FIELDS OF PERIL: CHILD LABOR IN U.S. AGRICULTURE 33 (2010), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/crd0510webwcover_1.pdf. 
140 Id. at 34. 
141 See Curtiss, supra note 86, at 321–23 (focusing on children harmed or killed in farm 
accidents in traditional farming families). 
142 In the Matter of Admin’r, Wage and Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Elderkin, 2000 
WL 960261, at *6 (DOL Admn. Rev. Bd. 2000).  
143 See Curtiss, supra note 86, 322–23 (explaining several reasons why safety regulations in 
agricultural occupations have not been improved).  
144 See Bergman, supra note 23, at 455–56 (“With trade becoming more liberalized, corpo-
rations are racing to produce goods quicker and cheaper than their competitors, which has 
exacerbated human rights problems for workers in developing countries.”).  
145 See id. (“The United States, as a global power, is currently in a position to recognize 
internationally recognized standards of conduct relating to labor.”). 
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IV. TO WHAT EXTENT DOES U.S. LAW COMPLY WITH ARTICLE 32? 
Most federal child labor laws already comply with the requirements 
in Article 32(2)(a) –(c).146 The FLSA includes provisions for a minimum 
age for employment,147 maximum hours for employment,148 working condi-
tions,149 and non-compliance penalties.150 However, a few key areas lack full 
compliance.151 Analyzing the similarities and differences between the FLSA 
and Article 32 clarifies the additional steps necessary in federal law.  
Courts have interpreted the Secretary of Labor’s regulations to pro-
vide additional protection beyond their express language. For example, in 
Hodgson v. Cactus Craft of Arizona, the Ninth Circuit issued an injunction 
against a manufacturer of novelty and souvenir gift items for permitting a 
minor to operate a power drill.152 The court clarified a regulation by the Sec-
retary of Labor prohibiting minors from operating “‘all fixed or portable 
machines or tools driven by power and used or designed for cutting, shap-
ing, forming (or) surfacing . . . wood.’”153 The court reasoned that although 
power drills were not specifically mentioned in the Secretary of Labor’s 
regulation, employees used the drill to shape wood into pieces for lamps, 
thus violating the regulation.154   
The District Court for the District of Columbia went through a simi-
lar analysis in expanding a regulation by the Secretary of Labor prohibiting 
children under eighteen from operating bakery machines in Winchell’s Do-
nut House v. U.S. Department of Labor.155 The Secretary of Labor, upon 
investigating the defendant employer’s doughnut shop, found it             
  
146 Mason, supra note 59, at 269.  
147 29 U.S.C. § 212(c) (2006).  
148 Id. § 207. 
149 Id. § 203(l).  
150 Id. § 216(e). The CRC was likely modeled after developed nations, like the U.S., which 
have had these types of regulations in place. Poland, who wrote the first draft of Article 32 in 
1978, included a provision about the minimum age and protection against exploitation. Sub-
sequent drafts attempted to nail down a specific age limit (e.g., fifteen years), provide for 
penalties, and time limitations. See OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., supra 
note 60, at 693–708 (providing previous drafts and criticism of Article 32).  
151 Mason, supra note 59, at 269.  
152 Hodgson v. Cactus Craft of Arizona, 481 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1973).  
153 Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1500.55 (1973)). The Secretary of Labor’s regulation has since 
been amended and can be found in the Code of Federal Regulations. 29 C.F.R. § 570.55 
(2010). Interestingly, the amended title of the regulation specifically mentions “power driven 
wood-working machines.” Id. 
154 Cactus Craft, supra note 152, at 467. The court also based its finding on the fact that the 
defendant employer admitted that they boy worked at the plant and used some of the power 
drills. Id. 
155 Winchell's Donut House v. U.S. Dep’t. of Labor, 526 F. Supp. 608, 610 (D.D.C. 1980); 
29 C.F.R.§ 570.62 (2011). 
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“particularly hazardous” for any employee under age eighteen to clean or 
operate the employer’s vertical dough mixer.156 The employer argued that 
the regulation regarding the operation of baking machines was not applica-
ble to retail establishments because such enterprises were not explicitly 
covered by the regulation.157 However, the court held that the regulation did 
not have to be amended to specifically include retail establishments, as it 
was created on an occupational basis rather than an industry basis.158  
These types of judicial interpretations of “hazardous” labor assist 
the U.S. in realizing the types of children’s rights described in Article 32(1). 
While Article 32(1) does not establish which occupations qualify as “haz-
ardous,” operating saws and power drills qualify as such due to the high risk 
of injury. The courts’ interpretations of the Secretary of Labor’s             
declarations are therefore a critical aspect of compliance with CRC Article 
32. 
A. Comparing Article 32 and Judicial Interpretation of “Oppressive 
Child Labor”  
Few federal courts have offered judicial interpretation of the 
FLSA’s definition of “oppressive child labor” in § 203(l).159 But, those 
courts that have offered such analysis have strictly interpreted the statute to 
comply with Article 32’s provisions.160 For instance, in Hodgson v. Ledet’s 
Foodliner of Larose, Inc., a supermarket employed fourteen- to sixteen-
year-old boys as grocery baggers for more than 18 hours per week when 
school was in session.161 The Eastern District of Louisiana found that the 
employer used “oppressive child labor” in violation of the FLSA, as well as 
several other labor violations.162 The court awarded the plaintiff $6,570.91 
to distribute evenly among the underage employees.163 
  
156 Winchell’s Donut House, 526 F.Supp. at 610.  
157 Id. 
158 Id. The court ultimately dismissed the suit on other due process grounds, which the 
appellate court later affirmed. See Winchell’s Donut House v. U.S. Dep’t. of Labor, 672 F.2d 
898 (1981).  
159 Courts would evaluate the definition of “oppressive child labor” in FLSA § 203(l) as it 
applies to § 212, which prohibits the use of oppressive child labor in interstate commerce. 29 
U.S.C. §§203(l), 212 (2006).  
160 Mason, supra note 59, at 272.  
161 Hodgson v. Ledet's Foodliner of Larose, Inc., No. 70-3226, 1974 WL 1077, at *1 (E.D. 
La. Jan. 18, 1974). 
162 Id. at *2. The court also found the defendant employer liable for failure to pay minimum 
wage, failure to pay overtime wages, and failure to make and preserve records in accordance 
with 29 C.F.R. § 531.58 (2011). Id. 
163 Id. 
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In Lenroot v. Interstate Bakeries Corporation, a bakery employed 
fourteen underage children aged fourteen to sixteen years.164 An agent for 
the Children’s Bureau discovered the children working when he inspected 
the bakery and subsequently brought suit for an injunction.165 The defendant 
employer did not contest the use of illegal child labor.166 Rather, the em-
ployer argued that an injunction was not necessary because the corporation 
had ceased employing underage children long before the Children’s Bureau 
initiated the lawsuit.167 The Eighth Circuit held the bakery liable for violat-
ing FLSA and remanded the case to the district court to grant an injunc-
tion.168 The Eighth Circuit also criticized the district court for dismissing the 
case, writing that the dismissal “was tantamount to judicial expression of 
acquiescence in and toleration of the unlawful conduct, and no such       
discretion is vested in the court.”169 
In Durkin v. Caroline Packing Corporation, an employer who man-
ufactured and sold canned tomatoes in interstate commerce employed mi-
nors as young as twelve to help with the canning process.170 The District 
Court of Virginia held the employer liable for using “oppressive child la-
bor” because the children missed at least one day of school in order to 
work.171 By strictly enforcing FLSA’s provisions on minimum age, hours, 
and penalties, American courts effectively ensure compliance with Article 
32(2)’s requirement that state parties take “legislative and administrative” 
measures.  
Furthermore, courts seem dedicated to allowing children access to 
school if they do secure employment. The District Court of Oklahoma has 
opined such, writing that the FLSA aims to ensure children the opportunity 
to attend school.172 This rationale is largely compatible with Article 32(1), 
  
164 Lenroot v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 146 F.2d 325, 326 (8th Cir. 1945). 
165 Id. at 327. 
166 Id. at 326.  
167 See id. at 326–27 (“[The corporation] contends that no injunction should be issued in 
the suit because ‘the violations, if any, do not exist at the present time, had not existed since 
long before the trial of this case (which was had in January, 1944) and no future violations 
are impending or threatened.”). 
168 Id. at 329.  
169 Id. at 329.  
170 Allan L. Schwartz, Validity, Construction, Application, and Effect of Child Labor Pro-
visions of Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 212 and Related Sections), 21 A.L.R. 
FED. 391, § 217 (1974). 
171 Id.  
172 See Shultz v. Brannon, 1970 WL 5544, at *1 (E.D. Okla. 1970) (holding that the 
FLSA’s purpose is to ensure children have the opportunity to attend school); cf. Schwartz, 
supra note 170, § 271 (discussing a California case, which stated the FLSA’s purpose is to 
abolish child labor).  
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which recognizes children may refuse to perform exploitative work or work 
that will likely interfere with their education.173  
B. Comparing Article 32 and Judicial Interpretation of “Hazardous” 
Child Labor 
Courts have also strictly applied the FLSA’s prohibition on under-
age children engaging in “hazardous” labor, which substantially complies 
with Article 32. In Cactus Crafts, the court held that operating a power drill 
fell within the “hazardous operation criteria” set forth by the Secretary of 
Labor as a form of prohibited child labor.174 Also, in Mitchell v. Del-Cook 
Lumber Company, a lumber company hired a minor approximately one year 
and three months before his eighteenth birthday to stack lumber, which had 
been at a sawmill.
 175 The District Court of Georgia held that the employer 
violated the Secretary of Labor’s regulations about hazardous occupa-
tions.176 Both the Ninth Circuit and the District Court of Georgia reached a 
result that comports with Article 32(1)’s description of labor that is likely to 
interfere with the child’s health or physical development. Saws and power 
drills require a high degree of skill to operate, which minors likely do not 
have.  
C. Other Laws Demonstrating Compliance with Article 32 
The U.S. ratification of the International Labour Organization’s 
Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor also demonstrates the U.S. 
compliance with Article 32.177 The Convention addresses the need to elimi-
nate the most objectionable forms of child labor, such as compulsory labor, 
child trafficking, prostitution, and using children in producing or trafficking 
  
173 One can argue that exploitative labor can include preventing a child from attending 
school, because in many developing countries a child worker’s access to education contrib-
utes significantly to ending the cycle of poverty.  
174 See Cactus Craft, supra note 152, at 467 (“We agree with the district court's determina-
tion that operation of a power drill fits within the hazardous operation criteria set by the 
Secretary as a form of prohibited child labor.”). Having a statute that categorizes an activity 
as hazardous is very helpful for courts in interpreting the FLSA. 
175 Schwartz, supra note 170, § 8(b).   
176 Id.  
177 Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour, supra note 11; Mason, supra note 59, at 274. The U.S. ratified 
this Convention on December 2, 1999. Ratifications for United States, INT’L LABOUR ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:3906739642112821::NO:11200:P11200
_COUNTRY_ID:102871 (last visited June 24, 2012). The U.S. ratified this convention sub-
ject to the requirement that it would not require a change in domestic law. Press Release, 
President Clinton Ratifies the New ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor: 
Promoting Core Labor Standards Around the World (Dec. 2, 1999), available at 
http://clinton3.nara.gov/WH/New/WTO-Conf-1999/factsheets/fs-013.html.  
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drugs.178 Ratification of this convention may eventually result in Congress 
reevaluating child labor laws, as states party should periodically examine 
the types of activities that may qualify as an objectionable form of child 
labor.179 Moreover, the sheer number of countries who have ratified this 
Convention demonstrates an international consensus that countries ought to 
take a tougher stance on child labor.180 Reevaluating the FLSA would likely 
prompt Congress to close some of the loopholes in § 213 for children in 
agricultural jobs and bring the U.S. closer to full compliance with Article 
32. 
D. Areas for Improvement 
FLSA § 212, which prohibits employers from using “oppressive 
child labor” in interstate commerce, appears to be in compliance with Arti-
cle 32’s provisions. However, the agricultural exceptions listed in § 213(c) 
are inconsistent with Article 32. These loopholes in § 213(c) prevent courts 
from providing remedies that would otherwise be available with legislation 
mirroring Article 32.  
The Middle District of Georgia faced this issue in Mitchell v. Horn-
buckle, when the Secretary of Labor sued a tomato farmer who employed 
children during school hours to help harvest and pack ripened tomatoes.181 
During the peak of harvesting season, the children regularly worked until 
midnight, and sometimes until two or three o’clock in the morning, which 
negatively impacted their performance in school.182 The court explained that 
the law provided no protection against employing children at night.183 For 
this reason the court added that, “this practice of night employment makes it 
all the more important that the law be strictly observed as far as it goes.”184 
  
178 Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour, supra note 11, art. 3(d).  
179 Id. art. 4(2); Mason, supra note 59, at 274.  
180 175 out of 183 members of the ILO have ratified the Convention on the Worst Forms of 
Child Labor as of June, 2012. The remaining countries yet to ratify are Cuba, Eritrea, India, 
Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mayanmar, Solomon Islands, Somalia, and Tuvalu. Ratifications 
of C182—Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), INT’L LABOUR ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:3532434342193878::NO:11
300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312327:NO (last visited June 24, 2012). The U.S. ratified 
this convention subject to the requirement that it would not require a change in domestic law. 
Press Release, President Clinton Ratifies the New ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of 
Child Labor: Promoting Core Labor Standards Around the World (Dec. 2, 1999), available 
at http://clinton3.nara.gov/WH/New/WTO-Conf-1999/factsheets/fs-013.html.  
181 Mitchell v. Hornbuckle, 155 F.Supp. 205 (M.D. Ga. 1957). 
182 Id. at 208. 
183 See id. at 212 (explaining that while working at night may not be beneficial for children, 
§ 213 does not address this issue). 
184 Id. 
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Ultimately, the court issued a permanent injunction against the employer to 
prevent him from hiring any child under sixteen years old during school 
hours.185 The FLSA did not permit the court to enjoin the employer from 
employing children at night.186 However, this case illustrates one of the ma-
jor gaps in the FLSA’s coverage. Due to its limited protection, the FLSA 
constrains courts from providing remedies to children who work in agricul-
tural jobs outside of school hours, but still suffer from the negative impacts 
such labor has on their education.  
On the other hand, courts do provide relief where the FLSA’s pro-
tections are applicable. For example, the Seventh Circuit strictly applied the 
FLSA’s prohibition on children working during school hours in Mitchell v. 
McCarty.187 In McCarty, the defendant employed children between seven 
and sixteen years as tomato pickers, causing the plaintiff children to miss 
the first three days of school to work on the farm.188 The court found that the 
employer violated the FLSA by employing children during school hours and 
issued an injunction.189 However, the court explained that the children were 
exempt from the minimum wage and overtime laws because they were 
working in agriculture.190 The child tomato pickers had no cause of action 
against the employer for violating the laws regarding minimum wage and 
overtime payments simply because they worked in agriculture.191 While the 
outcome in this case was relatively positive for the child workers, it is not 
likely that any remedy would have been available if the children worked 
outside of school hours. 
Since courts cannot provide judicial remedy to children in agricul-
tural occupations who are paid less than minimum wage or who work over-
time, courts focus on whether the children work during school hours.192 This 
provision of the FLSA is easy for employers to avoid if they schedule the 
  
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Mitchell v. McCarty, 239 F.2d 721, 724 (7th Cir. 1957).  
188 See id. at 722 (explaining that school resumed September 6, and the record shows that 
the children worked on Sept. 6, 7, and 8 of that year). 
189 See id. (implying the employer did not meet burden of proof to show an exemption 
under the FLSA). 
190 Id.  
191 In the FLSA, agriculture has the most numerous and broadest exceptions. Compare 29 
U.S.C. § 212 with id.§ 213.  
192 See McCarty, 239 F.2d at 724.  
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children to work outside school hours.193 By exploiting this loophole, chil-
dren’s education is harmed in ways that this law was meant to protect.194  
Another potential obstacle to compliance with Article 32 is that the 
FLSA only applies to child labor in interstate commerce conducted by large 
enterprises.195 Even though the FLSA substantially covers a significant 
amount of scenarios and courts find interstate commerce exists in most situ-
ations, the few cases that a court may decide that there is no international 
commerce prove troublesome. In such cases, children must rely on state 
laws for protection where interstate commerce is not involved or the      
enterprise has an annual gross profit less than $500,000.196   
Unfortunately, not all states offer adequate protection.197 Illinois, for 
example, allows children as young as ten to work on farms outside school 
hours and does not require proof of age.198 Missouri, on the other hand only 
allows children fourteen and older to work outside school hours.199 The dis-
parity in state coverage falls short of a uniform system enacted to protect 
child laborers’ health and access to education.200 Although the reach of in-
terstate commerce is quite wide, there may still be some situations where 
the FLSA would not apply.201 To more fully comply with Article 32, the 
states must harmonize their legislation and provide enough protection to 
meet the minimum standard of compliance.202  
  
193 See Hornbuckle, 155 F.Supp. at 212 (declining to enjoin the defendant from employing 
children at night).  
194 Few courts have addressed the purpose of child labor laws, but those who have explain 
that protecting children is of paramount importance. See supra text accompanying notes 
170–73.   
195 29 U.S.C. § 212(c). 
196 Mason, supra note 59, at 273; 29 U.S.C. § 218(a). Section 218 provides that a state with 
laws more stringent than the FLSA must follow the more stringent state law, rather than 
follow the FLSA.  
197 For an in-depth chart of the minimum ages and hours for children engaged in agricultur-
al occupations, see State Child Labor Laws Applicable to Agricultural Employment, U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/agriemp2.htm (last modified Jan. 1, 2011). 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Curtiss, supra note 86, at 326.  
201 Mason, supra note 59, at 274.  
202 Id.  
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V. ADOPTING A STATUTE WITH ARTICLE 32’S FUNCTIONALITIES WOULD BE 
BENEFICIAL: A COMPARISON TO THE TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT 
While many states have laws relating to children’s rights, most of 
them are reactive.203  Passing legislation designed to implement the ideas 
outlined in Article 32 would improve the protections available to children in 
agricultural occupations, as well as children who fall under one of the 
FLSA’s other exemptions. Moreover, a domestic statute would provide 
“‘hard law” rulings for alien victims of child labor, most of whom probably 
could not obtain relief elsewhere.204 Implementing such a statute also has 
the potential benefits of vindicating children’s rights, deterring future viola-
tions, and providing direct financial compensation to victims of exploitative 
child labor.205  
The Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) demonstrates that 
adopting the text of an international human rights treaty has already been a 
successful endeavor.206 Congress enacted the TVPA after the U.S. ratified 
the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment.207  This international agreement requires state 
parties to take measures to prevent torture.208 The U.S. ratified this Conven-
tion subject to the reservations that the agreement would not be self-
executing and that domestic legislation must be implemented.209 Congress 
  
203 See Howard Davidson, Children’s Rights and American Law: A Response to What’s 
Wrong with Children’s Rights, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 69, 71 (2006) (“[T]he United States 
only has narrowly tailored “rights based” state laws for children.”).  
204 Vanessa R. Waldref, The Alien Tort Statute After Sosa: A Viable Tool in the Campaign 
to End Child Labor?, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 160, 177 (2010).  
205 See id. (providing a list of potential benefits as they related to using the Alien Tort Stat-
ute to improve labor standards).  
206 Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).  
207 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/51 (June 26, 1987). 
208 See id. art. 2 (requiring state parties to take legislative, administrative, and judicial 
measures to prevent torture). 
209 See Status of Ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org 
/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=IV9&chapter=4&lang=
en#Participants (last modified June 25, 2012) (providing a complete list of ratifications and 
reservations for this convention). The TVPA defines torture as:  
[A]ny act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody or physical con-
trol, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only 
from or inherent in, or incidental to lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, 
is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that 
individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing that individual 
for an act that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind. 
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thus passed the TVPA in order to “alleviate some of the jurisdictional diffi-
culties faced by human rights victims”.210 
The TVPA’s stated purpose is to “carry out obligations of the U.S. 
under the U.N. Charter and other international agreements pertaining to the 
protection of human rights by establishing a civil action for recovery of 
damages from an individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial kill-
ing.”211 The TVPA creates a civil cause of action for victims of government 
torture, but not private torture.212 Most importantly, plaintiffs of any nation-
ality can bring a claim under the TVPA.213 A victim may bring suit in feder-
al courts, provided that he or she has already exhausted all other “adequate 
and available remedies” in the place where the torture occurred.214  
The TVPA has been a successful law in many ways. Congress in-
tended for the TVPA to stand as a “clear and unmistakable message that the 
U.S. will not provide a safe haven to torturers.”215 Also, by creating a new 
civil cause of action for foreign citizens, the TVPA expanded the pool of 
potential plaintiffs.216 Moreover, enacting the TVPA affirmed that the U.N. 
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are binding upon 
the U.S. as sources of customary international law.217 The TVPA’s drafters 
incorporated a definition of torture found in international law, thereby    
reinforcing the bond between American and international law.218  
Courts have also recognized the importance of the TVPA in provid-
ing victims of torture with proper jurisdiction and a cause of action. For 
  
Torture Victim Protection Act § 3(b)(1).  
210 Jennifer Correale, The Torture Victim Protection Act: A Vital Contribution to Interna-
tional Human Rights Enforcement, 6 PACE INT’L L. REV.197, 198 (1994).  
211 See generally Torture Victim Protection Act; Torture Victim Protection Act of 1989: 
Hearing on S.1629 and HR.1662 Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee 
Affairs of the Committee of the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 30 – 36 (1990) [hereinafter TVPA 
1989 Congressional Hearing] (discussing the desirability of allowing an alien to seek reme-
dy in U.S. courts). 
212 Torture Victim Protection Act § 2(a)–(b). The torturer must have been acting under 
“actual or apparent authority,” or, the “color of law” of any foreign nation. Id. 
213 Debra M. Strauss, Enlisting the U.S. Courts in a New Front: Dismantling the Interna-
tional Business Holdings of Terrorist Groups Through Federal Statutory and Common Law 
Suits, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 679, 710 (2005). This article also discusses how some 
victims of terrorism have tried to seek remedy in U.S. courts pursuant to the TVPA. Id.  
214 TVPA, supra note 206, § 2(b). 
215 TVPA 1989 Congressional Hearing, supra note 211, at 55 (statement of John Shattuck 
of Amnesty International).  
216 Christopher W. Haffke, The Torture Victim Protection Act: More Symbol than Sub-
stance, 43 EMORY L.J. 1467, 1491 (1994).  
217 Correale, supra note 210, at 208.  
218 See Torture Victim Protection Act § 3(b)(1) (incorporating the definition of “torture” 
found in the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment).  
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example, in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, the plaintiffs brought a class action 
suit under the TVPA and ATS against the estate of the former president of 
the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos.219 The plaintiffs claimed that the Philip-
pine military and paramilitary forces committed human rights violations.220 
The lawsuit was filed in Hawaii, where Marcos and his family had fled to in 
1986.221 The plaintiffs were either victims of torture themselves or family 
members of victims who were executed or “disappeared” as a result of Mar-
cos’ actions.222 The Ninth Circuit held that jurisdiction was proper and that 
the estate was liable under the TVPA, even though Marcos himself had not 
performed the abuse.223  
In Kadic v. Karadzic, the Second Circuit reached a similar conclu-
sion.224 In Kadic, Croat and Muslim citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
sued Radovan Karadz i , president of the unrecognized Bosian-Serb entity 
of “Srpska,” under the TVPA and ATS for crimes against humanity.225 The 
plaintiffs alleged that  aradz i  should be liable under the TVPA because he 
acted in his official capacity as the leader of Srpska, or, alternatively, that he 
acted in collaboration with the recognized nations of Yugoslavia and Ser-
bia.226 The Second Circuit reversed the trial circuit and held that jurisdiction 
was proper and the plaintiffs had sufficiently demonstrated that “Srpska” 
was a state for the purposes of liability under the TVPA.227  
In crafting the language of a domestic statute, Congress should in-
corporate language and terminology used by the CRC. A “Model Statute” 
can be found in Appendix A of this Note. Just as the TVPA embodied the 
functionalities of the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, so does the Model Stat-
ute. For example, creating a clear definition of “economic exploitation” is 
crucial for guiding a court’s interpretation and application of the statute. As 
demonstrated by Judge Posner in Flomo, linguistic ambiguities, if          
substantial enough, can destroy a court’s ability to provide relief to a    
  
219 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 771 (9th Cir. 1996) 
220 Id. Most of the facts of the case were discussed at the district court level and the Ninth 
Circuit simply referred back to such discussion. This Note references the facts as described 
by the trial court. See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F.Supp 1460 (D. 
Haw. 1995). 
221 Id. at 1461. 
222 Id. at 1461–62. Approximately 9,541 individuals participated as plaintiffs. Id. at 1462. 
223 Hilao, 103 F.3d at 787.   
224 See generally Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir. 1995). 
225 Id. at 237.  
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
File: Kistenbroker 2 Created on: 9/1/2012 3:01:00 PM Last Printed: 9/1/2012 6:29:00 PM 
2012] IMPLEMENTING ARTICLE 32 951 
plaintiff.228 The language Congress chooses is especially important here 
since an American court may be a foreign plaintiff’s last chance for judicial 
remedy.229  
The Model Statute’s primary function is to take different bodies of 
law that already exist and create a private cause of action for victims of ex-
ploitative or harmful child labor, regardless of the plaintiff’s nationality.230  
To accomplish this, the Model Statute borrows language from the TVPA, 
the FLSA, and the CRC. Like the TVPA, the Model Statute provides both 
jurisdiction and a civil cause of action for victims of certain prohibited child 
labor practices. The Model Statute also incorporates language from the CRC 
in defining “exploitative” child labor and describing the different types of 
hazards that can arise in the workforce.231 It is important to use the CRC’s 
language in describing objectionable labor conditions, as the main function-
ality of Article 32 is to describe how children have a right to protection 
from such conditions.  
The Model Statute also works to fill specific gaps in the FLSA by 
reinforcing the FLSA’s general provision that children under sixteen are 
ineligible for work.232 Unlike the FLSA, the Model Statute does not exempt 
family employment from virtually all regulation, thereby reducing the op-
portunities for parental exploitation. Moreover, this change ensures that 
children who are employed as “independent contractors” by their parents 
are entitled to receive at least minimum wage. The Model Statute also does 
  
228 See Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1024 (explaining that the ambiguities in international child labor 
law did not provide a basis for the court to determine that Firestone actually did commit a 
violation). 
229 This is true provided that the TVPA’s language and functionalities are incorporated into 
the domestic statute. See the Model Statute in Appendix A. See Torture Victim Protection 
Act § (2)(b) (“A court shall decline to hear a claim under this section if the claimant has not 
exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to 
the claim occurred.”). Approximately one third of the world’s child laborers are located in 
countries that have not ratified either Convention 182 (worst forms of child labor) or Con-
vention 138 (minimum age). Facts on Child Labour 2010, INT’L LABOUR ORG. (Apr. 2010) 
available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/ 
publication/wcms_126685.pdf.  
230 In the Model Statute, the TVPA’s language helps create a specific cause of action and 
provide for appropriate jurisdiction courts of the U.S. See Torture Victim Protection Act § 2 
(opening the specific cause of action to foreign plaintiffs).  
231 See CRC, supra note 11, art. 32(1) (“[R]ecogniz[ing] the right of the child to be protect-
ed from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous 
or to interfere with the child's education, or to be harmful to the child's health or physical, 
mental, spiritual, moral or social development”).  
232 The Model Statute, infra Appendix A, § 2(a), uses sixteen years of age as the minimum 
for most forms of labor. The Model Statute is also consistent with the FLSA’s ban on certain 
types of labor for minors—namely mining and manufacturing. 
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not create exceptions for children in agricultural employment.233 Any type 
of labor that puts children’s safety in danger should be regulated, but this is 
especially true for agricultural labor, given the high incidence of farming 
accidents.234  
By omitting most of the FLSA’s exceptions,235 the Model Statute ef-
fectively increases the breadth of protection available to child laborers.  
Congress, in enacting legislation similar to the Model Statute, would bring 
the U.S. closer to compliance with Article 32. Using the TVPA for guidance 
proves to be a valuable starting point in the process of enacting a domestic 
statute mirroring the functionalities of an international human rights treaty. 
And although the TVPA is not the absolute solution to preventing and end-
ing torture globally, it is certainly a benchmark of U.S. progress.236 Similar-
ly, enacting the protections of article 32 as a domestic statute would not 
completely abolish exploitative child labor within the global community. To 
think so would be highly unrealistic. Rather, such a statute could provide a 
model for other countries to base their new legislation upon.237  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Child laborers around the world, including the U.S., bear the burden 
of working as cheap labor.238 As a result of inadequacies in federal and for-
eign child labor laws, children suffer from physical and mental illnesses, 
injury, and even sometimes death.239 Congress should implement a domestic 
statute embodying the functionalities of article 32 of the CRC because it 
would establish and recognize the protections therein, as well as mirror 
emerging norms in international law. Like TVPA, such a law would serve 
  
233 The Model Statute treats forms of exploitative and hazardous labor with an equal hand.  
234 OSHA Fact Sheet: Farm Safety, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Safety and Admin. 
(Sept. 2005), available at http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data_General_Facts/FarmFact 
S2.pdf.  
235 Note that the Model Statute still allows for the Secretary of Labor to make additional 
findings that certain occupations or machinery is too hazardous for children of a certain age.  
236 See Correale, supra note 210, at 220 (“Although [the TVPA] is by no means the end all 
be all of human rights enforcement, it cannot be dismissed as just a nice gesture on the part 
of Congress.”).  
237 See Matthew H. Murray, The Torture Victim Protection Act: Legislation to Promote the 
Enforcement of Human Rights of Aliens in U.S. Courts, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 673, 
714 (1987) (“[T]he TVPA would provide a model for further legislation defining the extent 
to which other customary human rights could be adjudicable in U.S. courts.”). 
238 See Children Pay a High Price for Cheap Child Labour, UNICEF, 
http://www.unicef.org/pon95/chil0016.html (last visited June 24, 2012); Navdip Dhariwal; 
Ernest Harsch, Child Labour Rooted in Africa’s Poverty: Campaigns Launched Against 
Traffickers and Abusive Work, 15 AFRICA RECOVERY 14 (2001).   
239 Child Labour—India’s Cheap Commodity, BBC NEWS (June 13, 2006), http://news.bb 
c.co.uk/2/hi/5059106.stm. 
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as a model for other countries and stand as a powerful vindication of Amer-
ica’s commitment to international human rights. 
VII. APPENDIX A – MODEL STATUTE 
CHILD LABORER PROTECTION ACT 
SECTION 1. TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the Child Laborer Protection Act. 
SECTION 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CAUSE OF ACTION. 
 
(a) LIABILITY.—An employer who— 
(1) employs a Child under age 16 in Exploitative or Haz-
ardous Labor Conditions shall, in a civil action, be liable for 
damages to that individual; or 
(2) employs a Child between the ages of 16 and 18 years in 
mining, manufacturing, or other occupations declared to be 
particularly hazardous by the Secretary of Labor pursuant 29 
U.S.C. § 203(l) (2006) shall, in a civil action, be liable for 
damages to that individual.  
 
(b) EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES.—A court shall decline to 
hear a claim under this section if the claimant has not exhausted 
adequate and available remedies in the place in which the con-
duct giving rise to the claim occurred. 
 
(c) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.—No action shall be main-
tained under this section unless it is commenced within 10 years 
after the cause of action arose. 
 
SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS. 
(a) Child – The word “Child” means every human being below the 
age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the 
child, majority is attained earlier. 
 
(b) Exploitative Labor Conditions – The term “Exploitative Labor 
Conditions” means labor which, by circumstance, condition, or 
nature interferes with the child’s health, mental development, 
morals, education, or social development, or labor which pays 
below the minimum wage per hour in the relevant jurisdiction. 
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(c) Hazardous Labor Conditions – The term “Hazardous Labor 
Conditions” means labor which by circumstance, condition, or 
nature creates a substantial risk of physical injury or death, ex-
posure to chemicals or other substances which are known to 
cause harm to an individual’s physical or mental development, 
entails working with explosives, power-driven equipment, or 
any other occupations which the Secretary of Labor has catego-
rized as “hazardous” by regulation or declaration.  
 
